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Solid waste management services are contracted out to private firms in many U.S. communities. 
Household waste collection, transport, and disposal are relatively straightforward services to define within 
the terms of a contract. The addition of recycling, however, significantly complicates matters. How 
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be used, or should these services be provided by government employees or purely private markets? These 
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How Local Governments Structure Contracts with Private 
Firms: Economic Theory and Evidence 
 on Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts 
Margaret Walls∗ 
I. Introduction 
Local governments contract out many public services, ranging from street 
cleaning and snow plowing to the operation of prisons and jails. Two of the most 
commonly contracted activities are residential solid waste collection and recycling. In 
fact, some experts have long considered that of the many services provided by local 
government, waste collection is a leading candidate for contracting out because it is a 
relatively straightforward, technologically simple activity and because the cost of service 
disruption is comparatively low (Bennett and Johnson 1980; Nelson 1997).  
Waste management is much less straightforward at the start of the 21st century, 
however, than it was 30 or even 20 years ago. Then, municipal solid waste management 
amounted to collecting all the trash that households generated, hauling it to a landfill, and 
dumping it in. Households paid for the service through property taxes or flat rates on 
water or sewer bills. But beginning in about the mid-1980s, communities became much 
more concerned with the volume of waste generated and disposed of, as well as the 
management of landfills. In addition to federal landfill standards, there now exist targets 
or goals on recycling or waste diversion (from landfills) at the state level, and several 
states require local communities to provide recycling services to their residents. The U.S. 
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Environmental Protection Agency estimates that there were 9,300 municipal curbside 
recycling programs in the country in 2000, compared with only 1,000 in 1988.1  
In a recent study Walls et al. (2003) found that the use of contracts between local 
government and private waste management firms is widespread for both waste and 
recycling services. In a 1995 sample of U.S. communities, contracts were used for 
residential waste collection, curbside collection of recyclables, and recyclables 
processing in 36%, 40%, and 30% of communities, respectively.2 The authors estimate a 
model of a community’s choice of service delivery method for both waste and 
recyclables collection and find that costs—particularly “economies of density” in service 
provision, transaction costs associated with contracting, and costs associated with state 
government mandates—are an important factor in local government decisionmaking. 
Political influence and regulatory “capture” variables, on the other hand, are not 
significant determinants of communities’ waste and recycling choices.  
Those results provide some reassurance that local governments take costs into 
account when making decisions, and that they presumably choose a contract over other 
options—government provision in particular—when it appears to be the least-cost option. 
An interesting follow-on question is addressed in this paper: how are contracts between 
local governments and private waste and recycling firms structured? In particular, how 
are local governments designing contracts to achieve the multiple objectives of cost 
minimization, service quality, and attainment of environmental objectives? The study is 
not a normative one—that is, my point is not to say how contracts should be structured. 
Rather, I call on results from the principal-agent and incomplete contracts literatures in 
economics to explain stylized facts in the industry.  
I begin by describing the principal-agent model and the theory of incomplete 
contracts, along with its forerunner, transaction cost economics. I then provide some 
                                                 
 
1In addition to collection of recyclable materials, yard waste collection and composting programs have 
become common. These were virtually unheard of in 1988, but by 2000, the U.S. environmental Protection 
Agency estimates, there were 3,800 across the country (U.S. EPA 2002). 
2 The results are based on a 1995 International City/County Management Association (ICMA) survey of 
1,071 communities. See Walls et al. (2003) for more details. 
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summary statistics on ownership of key waste and recycling facilities, such as landfills, 
waste-to-energy incinerators, transfer stations, composting facilities, and recyclable 
materials processing facilities. The incomplete contracts literature emphasizes the role of 
relationship-specific assets; thus it is interesting to look at who owns these different types 
of assets and what the theory has to say about these patterns of ownership. Seven U.S. 
communities that have achieved relatively high rates of waste diversion and recycling are 
then analyzed in greater detail. I look at ownership of waste and recycling facilities in 
these communities, whether a single firm or separate contractors are used for both waste 
and recycling, and whether contracts are structured to provide incentives to increase 
recycling. I also pay attention to how incentives are provided to households: directly by 
the government or indirectly through the structure of the contract between the 
government and the private firm managing the materials. One community that has 
experimented with incentive-based contracts to a greater extent that most other 
communities—San Jose, California—is analyzed in more detail and compared with other 
communities. 
2. The Principal-Agent Framework and Optimal Contracts
3 
An agency relationship exists when one individual, called the agent, acts on 
behalf of another, called the principal. Often the principal owns an asset and hires the 
agent to increase its value. Many examples of principal-agent relationships exist in 
society: shareholders of a company and the managers who run it; a client and his lawyer; 
a patient and her doctor; and local government and the contractors it uses to provide 
government services, such as waste collection.4 Wherever there are gains from 
specialization, an agency relationship is likely to arise because of comparative advantage. 
                                                 
 
3 The principal-agent framework was pioneered by Ross (1973), and the literature on the implications of 
these models and the design of contracts is large and growing. For this discussion, I relied primarily on a 
review article by Hart and Holmstrom (1987), chapters 6 and 7 of Milgrom and Roberts (1992), and 
Grossman and Hart (1983).  
4 Local government is actually an agent for the citizens of the community; however, we ignore that added 
layer here. 
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The terms of an agency relationship are spelled out by a contract. The contract 
specifies the payments to be made by the principal to the agent, contingent on the agent’s 
taking certain actions and/or the principal’s observing certain outcomes. If the principal 
can perfectly observe the agent’s effort and knows what constitutes an efficient level of 
effort, then a contract can be written that will lead to a first-best outcome. In reality, 
however, the agent’s level of effort is usually unobservable. Shareholders do not know 
how hard the managers are working to increase profits; patients cannot be completely 
sure of the level of effort undertaken by their doctors on their behalf; the government 
cannot perfectly monitor the effort level of its contractors. These hidden actions, and the 
fact that all individuals tend to act in their own best interests, can lead to problems of 
shirking. In most contractual relationships, this “moral hazard” problem prevents 
attainment of a first-best outcome. However, contracts can be designed to limit the extent 
of the problem, and in what follows, I discuss the features of second-best optimal 
contracts. 
When effort, or the level of inputs, is unobservable, contracts can base 
compensation on observable outcomes. In general, if outcomes can be measured with 
continuous variables, contracts will usually specify payment as simple functions of 
outcomes, such as linear functions, threshold functions, or some combination of the two. 
A linear contract takes the following form: 
 
(1)               p(x) = α+βx 
 
where p(x) is the amount paid to the agent, x is the measured outcome, and α and β are 
chosen constants. The higher the value of β, the stronger the link between the payoff to 
the agent and the observed performance measure, x. Linear contracts are quite common in 
practice: commissions paid to sales agents, contingency fees paid to lawyers, “piece 
rates” paid to factory workers. 
A threshold contract takes the following form: 
 












x x if p
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In this case, the agent receives a low payment, p0, if a performance goal, x
*, is not 
reached—that value could even be zero—and a high payment, p1, if the goal is reached. 
Some contracts combine a threshold with a linear contract for performance above the 
threshold:  
 











x x if x




If the measured outcome, x, depends on random factors in addition to the agent’s 
level of effort, then paying the agent based on x will mean that the agent is incurring 
some risk. And the “sharper,” or more high-powered, the incentives, the more risk the 
agent incurs. As long as the agent is risk-neutral, this is not a problem. In fact, if the agent 
is risk-neutral, she should bear all the risk. In other words, it would be efficient to have a 
contract of this form: 
 
(4)              p(x) = α+x 
 
This is a linear contract, but the agent keeps all the residual gains created by her 
effort (i.e., β=1). An example of a contract of this type might be a franchise arrangement, 
whereby the value α is a negative amount equal to the franchise fee. Once the agent has 
the franchise, she keeps all the returns from her effort—that is, x would be profits and 
every additional dollar in profits accrues fully to the franchise holder. Another example 
would be a fixed-price procurement contract in which a contractor is paid a fixed fee α to 
provide a service, such as waste collection, the costs of which are –x. Firms bidding for a 
collection contract should submit bids based on expected collection costs, so α in 
equation (4) would cover expected costs. If the firm is able to reduce its costs ex post,  
it would keep any residual gain. These types of compensation arrangements exist in  
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waste collection and recycling contracts, and we discuss their effects in more detail in 
Section IV. 
In practice, agents may often be risk-averse.5 To induce an agent to accept a 
fixed-price contract, or any contract that ties her payoff to an outcome over which she 
does not have full control, the principal must pay a risk premium. This means that an 
optimal contract will involve some sharing of the risk between the principal and the 
agent. Ideally, if incentives were not an issue, risks would be borne by the least risk-
averse individual in the transaction. However, the contract needs to provide incentives as 
well as balance risks. This means that the agent will need to be guaranteed some income 
regardless of performance but will also need to be provided enough incentive that she 
does not shirk. The linear contract in equation (1) can do this, and the optimal value of 
β—that is, the sharpness of the incentives—will depend on four factors: 
1.  The agent’s degree of risk aversion. A contract with sharp incentives will be 
expensive when the agent is highly risk-averse, since a large risk premium 
would be required. This means that in general, the more risk-averse the agent, 
the less that compensation should be tied to performance, and the lower the 
optimal value of β. 
2.  The marginal contribution of effort to the measure of performance (and the 
smaller the role played by random factors). If more effort by the agent does 
not increase performance by very much, or if other factors outside the agent’s 
control play a large role, the optimal value of β is lower.  
3.  The precision with which performance is measured. If the performance 
measure does a poor job of tracking the outcome that the principal really cares 
about, then the link between that measure and the agent’s pay should not be 
strong, and β should be lower.  
                                                 
 
5 An individual is said to be risk averse if he prefers a sure thing to a gamble of equal expected value. A 
risk-neutral individual is indifferent between the two outcomes. 
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4.  The degree to which the agent responds to incentives by increasing effort. If 
inducing additional effort from the agent is difficult, an optimal contract has a 
weaker link between compensation and performance, and β is lower.  
The third factor above says that the precision of the performance measure matters 
for the sharpness of the incentives in the contract. This implies that it might be 
worthwhile for the principal to invest in resources to improve the precision of those 
measures. Improving the precision would reduce the risk premium that needs to be paid 
to get the agent to accept a contract with sharp incentives, and the sharper the incentives, 
the harder the agent works. One way to improve the precision of performance measures is 
to increase monitoring of performance. If a community wanted to use a performance 
contract to encourage recycling, for example, it could tie the contractor’s compensation to 
the volume of materials recycled. It could even use differential compensation by material 
type. However, to do this accurately, it would need to monitor carefully to ensure that 
materials are not only collected for recycling but are actually processed and sold in 
secondary markets (and not just taken to the landfill). The government could do this by 
requiring bills of sale, trucking manifests, and so forth. 
Even precise performance measures do not necessarily ensure good outcomes, 
however. A principal might have a very good measure of one aspect of performance, say 
a quantity measure, but no measure at all of another aspect of performance, say quality. If 
the agent’s compensation is based only on the first measure, and the two measures are 
substitutes, then they can be “gamed”—that is, the agent devotes too much time to 
increasing quantity and not enough to increasing quality. An example would be a 
payment schedule for picking strawberries that is based on the weight of strawberries 
picked. Workers have no incentive to take care not to damage the strawberries when 
picking them. Another example is basing teacher evaluations on the performance of 
students on standardized tests. This type of contractual arrangement will lead teachers to 
focus their efforts on one measure of overall teaching performance, the results on the 
standardized tests (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  
In waste and recycling collection, it might be important to ensure that contractors 
do not litter or damage bins or property as they collect materials, that they show up at 
scheduled times, and so forth. Another problem in the waste area can arise if a contractor 
is compensated based on the volume of materials recycled, some of which are more 
valuable than others. The community might prefer to see the contractor recycle relatively 
more of the more valuable materials. One way of ensuring that this takes place would be 
to make the contractor the residual claimant on any revenues received (or losses incurred) 
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from the processing and sale of materials. That would give him the incentive to collect 
and recycle the more valuable materials.  
The gaming problem feeds back to the need for monitoring. It may be worthwhile 
for the principal to supplement monitoring of the stated performance outcome with 
measurement of other “signals” of appropriate effort. For example, teachers are often 
paid more when they take additional college-level courses because, presumably, these 
courses enhance their teaching ability. A government waste collection contractor may 
have its compensation based on a quantity measure, such as number of households 
served, but it may also have its customer service levels monitored in some way. The 
government could keep a record of, for example, the number of customer complaints, the 
time that elapses before customer complaints are addressed, and the severity of 
complaints. In general, such monitoring can mitigate the incentive that the agent has to 
neglect dimensions of performance that are not directly tied to remuneration. 
Furthermore, use of increased information in determining payment can reduce 
uncertainty and thus lower the risk premium necessary for the agent to accept the 
contract. 
3. The Incomplete Contracts Approach
6 
The principal-agent approach to the study of contracts emphasizes, to a great 
extent, the role played by risks. If parties to a contract are risk-neutral and if there is no 
hidden information or actions, according to the theory, a first-best efficient outcome can 
be reached. However, in reality, there can be situations in which these two conditions 
hold and yet efficient contracts are still unattainable. The reason is that contracts are often 
incomplete. 
In the literature on incomplete contracts, the reason that two parties decide to have 
a long-term contractual relationship is generally because of the existence of investments 
that are, at least to some extent, relationship-specific. In other words, to trade with each 
                                                 
 
6 This summary of the incomplete contracts literature is based on studies by Hart and Moore (1990), Hart et 
al. (1997), Hart (1995), and Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and on the literature on transaction costs, which is 
represented by Williamson (1985) and Klein et al. (1978). 
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other, the parties need to make certain investments, and those investments have a higher 
value within the relationship than outside it.7 Once the investments are made, each party 
has some monopoly power ex post even if there was competition ex ante. To get around 
this problem, a contract of some type is necessary. If there are no costs associated with 
writing, monitoring, and enforcing the contract, then a comprehensive contract can be 
written that spells out all possible contingencies and what should be done in each case. In 
a standard principal-agent model, even when the first-best cannot be attained because of 
hidden actions, an optimal second-best contract will still be comprehensive in that it will 
specify each party’s obligation in every possible contingency. But in many situations, 
writing, monitoring and enforcing contracts are not costless. This fact lies at the heart of 
the longstanding literature on transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985; Klein et al. 
1978). That literature reveals that three important factors are ignored in the principal-
agent framework. First, it is difficult for people to think ahead and plan for all 
contingencies. Second, even if individual plans can be made, parties have difficulty 
negotiating over these plans. And third, even if planning and negotiating are viable, it 
may be impossible to write a contract that can be enforced in a court of law. In other 
words, both parties may have the same information and agree on particular outcomes but 
those outcomes are not verifiable to a third party. As a result of these factors, contracts 
will be incomplete. 
This would not be such a serious problem if the costs of renegotiating contracts 
were zero. But they are not; moreover, even if the parties are willing to incur 
renegotiation costs, if they have asymmetric information at the renegotiation stage, they 
may not be able to reach an efficient agreement. Even these problems would not be 
serious if the parties could easily turn to new trading partners at that point. But this brings 
us back to the importance of sunk costs: investments have been made that have less value 
outside of the relationship than they have within it, and those investments bind the parties 
together. The existence of these assets can lead one party in the contract to attempt to 
hold up the other in negotiations. In fact, when contracts are incomplete, the parties may 
                                                 
 
7 The term investment is used loosely here. Whenever one party is forced to pass up an opportunity as a 
result of a relationship with another party, an investment—that is, a “sunk cost,” either a direct or an 
opportunity cost—has been made (Hart and Holmstrom 1987). 
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be deterred from making the relationship-specific investments in the first place. In the 
transaction cost economics literature, it is this fact that suggests a need for vertical 
integration—that is, having a single firm perform the functions that, in a world with 
complete contracting, could be done by two separate firms.  
Likewise, transaction costs and incomplete contracts can provide an argument for 
government provision of a service.8 For services that are typically arranged by local 
government, such as waste management, government officials usually choose between 
using government-owned assets and employees and writing a contract with a private 
firm.9 If there are significant transaction costs associated with writing, monitoring, and 
enforcing a contract, and there are relationship-specific assets necessary for providing the 
services, the government may choose to own and operate these assets itself. In the case of 
waste and recycling services, these assets include secondary materials processing 
facilities, waste transfer stations, incinerators, and landfills. In the next section of the 
paper, I look at the ownership patterns of these assets in a sample of U.S. communities. 
4. Waste and Recycling Contracts in U.S. Communities 
4.1 Waste Collection and Ownership of Waste Facilities  
In a community without a recycling program, the basic service that a solid waste 
contractor provides to a local government is collection of all the waste generated by all 
households in the community on a regular basis, often once a week; transport of that 
waste to a transfer station, landfill, or waste-to-energy incinerator; and then disposal of 
the waste at that location.10 Collection is a relatively straightforward service that is easy 
                                                 
 
8 See Hart et al. (1997) for more on this and an application to management of prisons. See also Shleifer 
(1998) for a general discussion of private versus government ownership and Domberger and Jensen (1997) 
for a survey of government contracting in the context of incomplete contracts. 
9 In some communities, for collection services, local government simply licenses private firms to operate in 
the jurisdiction. However, this arrangement is less common than contracts and government provision. 
10 Waste transfer stations are large buildings or outdoor areas where waste is stored temporarily before 
being consolidated for shipping by truck or rail to a landfill or incinerator, often outside the community. 
Waste-to-energy incinerators burn waste to generate electricity; they are not common in the United States. 
Most waste is ultimately disposed of in landfills. 
  10Resources for the Future                                                                                                       Walls 
to define within the terms of a contract. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement is 
comparatively inexpensive for the government because households themselves, in effect, 
do much of the monitoring. The contract may include some other aspects of performance, 
such as minimal littering and truck noise, but again, community residents help monitor. 
Capital assets used in provision of the service, such as collection vehicles, can be moved 
relatively easily to a new location. This means that they are not relationship-specific and 
thus not a potential source of contractual holdup. Therefore, waste collection contracts 
should be relatively complete. And in the absence of recycling, issues of risk should be 
minimal. The extent of “economies of density” are the determining factor in costs—that 
is, the costs of providing the service tend to fall as population density rises, and thus, 
knowing the number of households and the geographic area to be served takes most of 
the uncertainty out of costs.11  
Once waste is collected, it must be legally disposed of. There are essentially three 
possibilities: (1) the collection contract can simply specify that waste be legally disposed 
of, leaving the contractor to find a landfill to accept the waste, either in a spot market 
transaction, through a separate contractual arrangement, or in its own facility; (2) the 
government can own a landfill (or other disposal facility) and require the collection 
contractor to dispose of waste in that facility; or (3) the government can have a separate 
disposal contract with a private landfill or other facility and require the collection 
contractor to deliver the waste to that facility. Because disposal facilities represent a 
fairly sizable capital investment and because, in some cases, they can be relationship-
specific, contractual incompleteness can be a problem for waste disposal. The 1995 
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) survey of 1,071 U.S. 
communities asked about market organization of waste transfer stations, incinerators, and 
landfills, and Table 1 reports some results. The table shows, for the communities that 
report having facilities within their jurisdictions, the percentages that are owned and 
                                                 
 
11 Several empirical studies find that collection costs exhibit so-called economies of density. See the 
findings and corresponding discussion in Dubin and Navarro (1988). 
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operated by government, organized through a contract with a private firm or sole source 
franchise, and owned by private firms without a government contract.12  
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, most of the communities that report 
having these facilities also report government ownership of them. Between 61% and 63% 
of transfer stations and incinerators and 56% of landfills are government owned.13 In 
recent years, there has been a trend toward large, privately owned regional landfills that 
accept waste from many areas, including, in some cases, waste transported from long 
distances (Ley et al. 2002). Landfills thus may be less relationship-specific than transfer 
stations and incinerators. This could explain why government ownership of landfills is 
lower than for the other two types of facilities. Incinerators have unique features that can 
present problems in contractual relationships. They are costly to build and operate and 
thus need a reliable supply of waste feedstock to generate revenues from electricity sales 
to offset those costs. Walls et al. (2003) found that government provision of waste 
collection services is more likely in communities where the government has owned an 
incinerator for five or more years than in communities without such facilities. 
4.2 Recycling and Ownership of Recycling Facilities 
When a community is concerned with reducing the volume of waste in addition to 
providing collection and disposal services, the question of how to structure contracts 
becomes more complicated. Steuteville (1995) reports that all but seven states set waste 
diversion or recycling mandates in 1995. In these cases, local government is faced with 
how best to structure contracts to spur recycling in a cost-effective manner.  
Several factors come into play. First, with simple waste collection contracts, 
households essentially need do nothing except put their trash in a proper receptacle and 
place it in the right location for collection. Since they have an individual incentive to do 
                                                 
 
12 Transfer stations exist in 43% of the communities in the ICMA survey, incinerators in 21%, and landfills 
in 68%. 
13 We include as “government” ownership by the local government responding to the survey as well as 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) among different branches of government. The latter are quite 
common for these facilities:Thirty-three percent of transfer stations, 57% of incinerators, and 35% of 
landfills are arranged by an IGA. In most cases, IGAs are between city and county branches of government. 
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this—they want their trash taken away—the contractor need not worry, for the most part, 
about the households’ doing the right thing. When waste diversion is an additional 
objective, however, it is necessary to induce households to recycle. Exactly how to do 
that within the structure of a contractual arrangement between the government and a 
private firm is a difficult issue. Should the government provide incentives directly to 
households, or should it structure the contract so that the contractor provides the 
incentives? 
Second, issues of risk are likely to be much more important when there is 
recycling. In part, this issue is related to the first one: if households do not reduce waste 
and the contract states that the contractor must meet the diversion target, then the 
contractor pays the penalty when the target is not met. It cannot directly control how 
much waste individual households generate or how much recycling they do. In addition, 
it may incur a risk after collection if it is fully responsible for processing and selling the 
recyclable materials collected. If the contractor is the residual claimant, it bears all the 
price risk. Secondary materials prices are notoriously volatile; thus this risk could be 
significant.  
Third, ownership of yet another fixed asset enters the picture. The collected 
materials must be processed, and the facilities necessary to do such processing—typically 
referred to as materials recovery facilities, or MRFs—are generally large and costly. As 
with the options for waste disposal, the government can handle processing of recyclables 
in several ways: (1) the collection contractor can own and operate the MRF; (2) the 
government can own and operate the MRF and require the contractor to bring the 
collected materials to the government facility14; (3) the government can have a separate 
contract with a processor and require the collection contractor to deliver materials to the 
facility under contract; or (4) processing and sale of materials can be left to private 
markets—a third party that handles processing either through a separate contractual 
arrangement with whoever collects the materials or through spot market transactions. 
Some materials have had a long history of profitable private-market recycling—
aluminum, some other metals, newspaper, and corrugated cardboard, for example—and 
                                                 
 
14 It might also be possible for the government to own the MRF but have a private contractor operate it. 
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thus relying on spot markets may be feasible in some locations. In addition to MRFs, 
composting facilities are necessary if yard waste is to be diverted from landfills. These 
facilities require a smaller capital investment than MRFs; nonetheless, the question of 
who should own and operate them remains. 
The ICMA survey asks communities the same questions about their composting 
facilities as it asks about waste facilities. More than 64% of communities that report 
having a composting facility say it is government owned and operated. Only 24% report 
having a contract or franchise arrangement, and 11% rely on private markets. Thus, 
government ownership is even more common for composting facilities than it is for the 
waste facilities listed in Table 1. 
Unfortunately, the ICMA survey did not ask exactly the same question about 
MRFs that it asked about landfills, transfer stations, incinerators, and composting 
facilities. Nonetheless, it did ask communities what arrangements they make for 
provision of particular waste and recycling services, including processing of recyclables. 
Table 2 reports results from the survey.  
If communities report that government employees are processing materials, it 
should mean that the government owns a processing facility. Therefore, according to 
Table 2, 30.4% of the communities with residential recycling programs own an MRF to 
process the collected materials or have an agreement with another government that owns 
one. The remaining communities, approximately 69.5% of the ICMA sample, use private 
markets—either via a contract or franchise or through spot market transactions.  
It is interesting that, in contrast to the waste facilities listed in Table 1, the 
government appears less involved in operating recycling facilities. Between 56% and 
63% of waste facilities, compared with only 30.4% of recycling facilities, are government 
owned. This could be the case for several reasons. Many municipal recycling programs 
are relatively new, whereas private recycling of some materials has been around for quite 
some time. Industrial scrap has been recycled for decades, as have, in some parts of the 
country, selected postconsumer materials—newspaper, cardboard, and aluminum cans, 
for example. Thus, in many cases, private processing facilities may have already been in 
place when the municipal collection of recyclables began. Instead of building their own 
facilities, which they may have been reluctant to do in any case, given the complicated 
nature of the enterprise relative to waste disposal, many communities may have chosen 
instead to rely on existing private facilities. Even if there were no existing local facilities, 
many communities may have been reluctant to take on the difficult job of processing 
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multiple types of materials and finding markets for those materials. This reluctance was 
probably exacerbated by the fact that a significant sunk cost would have to be incurred. 
Walls et al. (2003) found that communities are more likely to have government 
collection of recyclable materials if the local government has owned an MRF for five or 
more years. This result indicates that these sunk costs affect decisions about the method 
of service provision. Contracts are likely to be incomplete; thus if the government owns 
the recycling facility, it may need to vertically integrate into collection of the materials. 
4.3 Waste and Recycling Contracts in Seven U.S. Cities 
In this section I describe the specific contractual arrangements of a set of U.S. 
communities identified in a recent study by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR 
1999) as successful in achieving high rates of recycling and waste diversion: Ann Arbor, 
Michigan; Bellevue, Washington; Fitchburg, Wisconsin; Portland, Oregon; St. Paul; San 
Jose, California; and Seattle. Although they may not be typical of all communities, they 
are likely to be representative of communities that are trying to achieve the multiple 
objectives laid out above: low-cost waste collection services and attainment of recycling 
and/or waste diversion goals. This paper is focusing on the design of contracts; six of the 
seven cities included here use contracts to manage their waste, their recyclables, or both. 
Only Portland relies on franchises, which are similar to contracts; thus we include it in 
our sample. All the communities except St. Paul competitively bid their contracts.  
I focus on the following features of the contracts: 
•  Is there a single contract for collection of both trash and recyclable materials, 
or are there two separate contracts?  
•  Does the collection contract specify exactly where the waste and the 
recyclable materials must go after they are collected? 
•  What is the term of the contract?  
•  Who owns and operates the waste facilities and the recycling facilities? 
•  Is the contract for disposal and/or processing of recyclables separate from the 
collection contract?  
•  Does the contract provide financial incentives that encourage the contractor to 
increase recycling? 
•  Who keeps the revenues from sale of secondary materials?  
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•  Is the contractor required to collect a specific list of recyclable materials from 
households, or does the contractor have some discretion over what is 
collected? 
•  Is the pricing of trash collection “pay-as-you-throw” (PAYT)—that is, do 
households pay a price per bag, per container, or per pound rather than a flat 
fee that does not vary with the volume collected? 
•  Is yard waste collected separately? 
There could be many other important features of the contracts; the questions 
above highlight the issues of risk, performance incentives, asset specificity, and contract 
incompleteness discussed in the previous two sections of the paper. It is of particular 
interest to see how the multiple objectives—low-cost provision of services along with 
attainment of recycling goals—are addressed. Do the contracts contain financial 
incentives for the contractor to increase recycling? Is the contractor free to determine 
how best to deal with households or does the government dictate specific requirements? 
Table 3 summarizes the findings. Five of the seven communities use a single 
contract to cover collection of waste and recyclables rather than having separate firms 
provide the two services. There are likely to be economies of scope in providing 
collection services, so it makes sense that a single contractor is used in most 
communities. Ann Arbor and St. Paul, the two communities that have separate contracts 
for collection of recyclables, both have long histories of doing business with the nonprofit 
firms that hold the recycling contracts. Moreover, neither uses a contract to manage waste 
collection: Ann Arbor has government provision, and St. Paul, a private market.  
Once the contractor collects the materials, some communities specify a delivery 
location for the materials. Communities that own waste transfer stations, have an 
arrangement with a county-owned transfer station, or have a contract with a landfill all 
require that waste be delivered to that specific waste facility. Bellevue, Portland, Seattle, 
and San Jose fall into this category. Fitchburg relies on private markets for waste 
disposal, simply requiring the collection contractor to ensure that waste is legally 
disposed of. St. Paul does not require the private waste collection firms that operate in the 
city to deliver waste to any particular facility. The city has run into problems in the past 
with this arrangement, however, because it owns a facility that makes refuse-derived fuel 
(RDF) that is used in power plants, and the facility needs a reliable supply of waste 
feedstock to operate cost-effectively. Without a contractual obligation to deliver the 
waste to that facility, the collection contractors are free to shop around for a lower tipping 
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fee, and in the past, they have done so. Four of the communities—Bellevue, Fitchburg, 
Portland, and St. Paul—do not require recyclable materials be delivered to any specific 
processing facility. With the exception of Fitchburg, these communities rely on private 
processors. The Seattle and San Jose collection contracts cover recyclables processing as 
well; thus, in those two cities, the recyclable materials go to the contracted firm’s 
facility.15 
None of the communities have separate processing contracts except Ann Arbor, 
where a city-owned MRF is operated by a contractor. In the other communities, 
processing is managed as part of the collection contract (Seattle and San Jose) or through 
separate arrangements made between the collection contractor and a private, third-party 
processor (Bellevue, Fitchburg, Portland, and St. Paul).16  
Government-owned transfer stations are common, but landfills and recycling 
facilities are privately owned and operated in five of the seven communities. Only 
Bellevue uses a government-owned landfill (owned by King County, where Bellevue is 
located), and St. Paul has a government-owned RDF plant. Ann Arbor and Fitchburg are 
the only communities in the sample that have government-owned recycling facilities, and 
Ann Arbor’s facility is operated by a private firm under contract to the city.  
The patterns of asset ownership and market arrangements in these communities 
seem to follow the patterns in the ICMA sample of communities that we discussed above. 
Waste disposal either takes place in a government-owned facility or is managed via a 
contract with a private firm, but recycling facilities are generally privately owned and 
operated. Moreover, it is not unusual for a contractor handling collection of recyclables to 
arrange for processing services with a private, third-party recycler; the government often 
takes a hands-off approach to processing. In contrast, contractors handling waste 
                                                 
 
15 In Seattle, there are two collection contractors covering different parts of the city. One of those 
contractors handles the processing of recyclables as well, and the other is required to deliver its materials to 
that processing facility. 
16 The county in which Fitchburg is located owns a processing facility, and currently, the recyclable 
materials are delivered to that facility. However, there is no contractual obligation for the firm handling 
collection to do that. 
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collection often are required by the government to dispose of that waste at a particular 
facility. 
In virtually all the communities, the government specifies how the contractor 
provides service to the households. The government states in the contract exactly which 
materials must be accepted for recycling; it mandates that yard waste be collected and 
managed separately; and it uses PAYT pricing.17 It also often specifies what waste 
disposal facilities and, in three of the communities, what recyclables processing facilities 
the contractor must use. Thus, contractors are not given much freedom to decide how 
recycling and waste diversion goals should be met. Instead, the government bypasses the 
contractor and makes decisions directly about how to deal with households and also 
dictates certain service requirements that the contractor must meet. 
If the contractor has little choice in what materials he collects, how he collects 
them, and what he does with them after he collects them, we can expect that incentive 
contracts would include payment of a substantial risk premium. Perhaps for this reason, 
with the exception of St. Paul and San Jose, local governments are not using direct 
recycling incentive payments in their contracts. And St. Paul’s payment is small—only 
$0.50 per ton of material recycled. In 1996, only $10,600 was paid to the contractor in the 
form of an incentive payment; in that same year, total recycling costs were reportedly 
$2.5 million (ILSR 1998).18 San Jose’s incentive payment is a threshold payment: the 
contractor receives a bonus if the recycling rate reaches 40% or above. It also pays a 
penalty if the rate drops below 35%. San Jose previously used a contract that paid per ton 
of material recycled but switched to this threshold system in mid-2002. I describe the 
previous contract in more detail below. 
                                                 
 
17 There are many other service requirements in waste and recycling contracts—such as once-a-week 
pickup, same-day collection of waste and recyclables, requirements on wages paid to workers, truck 
inspections and licensing, and many others. Since this paper is focusing on the addition of recycling and 
waste diversion requirements to traditional waste management, I focus on features of the contracts that are 
linked with these requirements. 
18 Total recycling costs are reported in ILSR (1998) along with total amount of materials recycled, 21,220 
tons. The $10,600 figure was obtained by multiplying $0.50 by 21,220. 
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Incentives can also be provided through the sale of secondary materials. 
Interestingly, the degree to which the contractor is the residual claimant on any of these 
revenues varies widely across the communities. In Seattle, none of the revenues go to the 
contractor; in three of the communities the contractor gets all the revenues; in the 
remaining three communities, the revenues are shared between the government and the 
contractor. In theory, the greater the share of revenues going to the contractor, the more 
incentive he has to increase both the volume of material recycled and the value of those 
materials. For example, he might increase efforts to collect relatively more of some 
materials (say, aluminum cans) from households and relatively less of others (certain 
plastics). He might also search for a processor that pays a higher price for the materials. 
On the other hand, the greater the share of revenues the contractor keeps, the greater the 
risk he faces. This may mean that the government has to pay a significant risk premium 
in contracts where the firm is the residual claimant. And again, with the lack of flexibility 
in service provision that these contracts allow, the risk premium could be especially high.  
The contractor compensation schemes for the seven cities can be represented in 
general mathematical terms by the following equation, a variant of equation (2) above: 
 
(5)            ( ) x R x c x p γ β φ α + + − = ) (  
 
where p(x) is total compensation; α is the fixed payment from the government (which is 
likely to be based on the number of households served); c is total collection costs; φ is the 
share of collection costs borne by the contractor (1-φ is the share borne by the 
government); β is the recycling incentive payment made by the government per ton of 
material recycled; x is tons of material recycled; R(x) is net revenues from sale of 
materials; and γ is the share of revenues from sale of materials that the contractor keeps. 
Any reduction or increase in collection costs that occurs after the contract has 
been awarded and service has begun is borne by the contractor, not the government—in 
other words, φ is equal to one for all of these contracts. This feature of waste and 
recyclables collection contracts appears to be common across most U.S. communities that 
use contracts—that is, the use of “cost-plus” elements is rare.  
The other parameters in equation (5) vary across the seven communities. Table 4 
shows the form that equation (5) takes for each. Ann Arbor, St. Paul, and San Jose have 
thresholds in their contracts. In Ann Arbor and St. Paul, the contractor keeps all revenues 
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from sale of materials unless revenues rise to a certain level, in which case the revenues 
are shared between the contractor and the government. In San Jose, rewards and penalties 
apply if the recycling rate goes above or below particular levels (in the table, the variable 
M represents total materials: all waste plus recycling). The parameter Ω in the table is the 
total financial penalty the contractor in San Jose pays if the recycling rate falls below 
35%; Π is the financial reward if the rate goes above 40%. Bellevue, Fitchburg, Portland, 
and Seattle all have simpler payment schemes, but it can be seen from the table that the 
extent to which the contractor keeps revenues—that is, the parameter γ in equation (5)—
varies widely across the communities, as explained above and shown in Table 3. 
Table 4 makes it clear that Bellevue and Portland use fixed-price (FP) contracts, 
in which all costs are borne by the contractor (or franchisee, in the case of Portland) and 
all revenues from secondary material sales are earned by the contractor (or franchisee). 
The same is essentially true for San Jose unless the recycling rate for single-family 
dwellings drops below 35% or rises above 40%; the contract has been in place only a 
year, but according to Ryan (2001a; 2001b), these outcomes are unlikely. In these 
contractual arrangements, the contractor has a strong incentive to exert effort to reduce 
collection and processing costs and find the best price for secondary materials. However, 
the contractor bears all the risk of secondary materials price swings; thus a risk premium 
is likely to be paid to the firms in these cities. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) also point out 
that FP contracts of this type may lead to higher renegotiation costs if things do not turn 
out as expected, thus FP contracts are preferred over “cost-plus” (C+) contracts only in 
cases where the reduced likelihood of renegotiation merits the additional ex ante costs of 
fully specifying performance.19 Banerjee and Duflo (2000) argue that FP contracts are 
preferred when the reputation of the contractor is more suspect; the more reputable the 
contractor, the more likely are C+ contracts.20 Either of these factors may come into play 
                                                 
 
19 Bajari and Tadelis (2001) focus on construction contracts, which are typically either C+ or FP in nature. 
Their view is that buyers and sellers are always trying to balance the tension between the ex ante costs of 
more fully specifying project design and the ex post costs of renegotiating a contract when the initial design 
is incomplete.  
20 The Banerjee and Duflo (2000) study focuses on the role of reputation in explaining the structure of 
contracts between software development firms and their clients. 
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here. In Seattle, the risk of secondary materials price swings is borne by the government; 
the contractor earns none of the revenues. Seattle is the only city in the sample for which 
this is the case. 
Ann Arbor’s and St. Paul’s threshold contracts have somewhat perverse 
incentives. The contractor incurs all the risk (and keeps all the rewards) when revenues 
are low but must share with the government when revenues are high. The contract thus 
encourages the contractor to exert effort to increase the amount of recycling and find the 
best price for secondary materials only up to the point at which the government starts to 
share in the revenues. Moreover, significant downside price risk is incurred by the 
contractor. 
As mentioned above, between 1993 and 2002, San Jose used a compensation 
mechanism in which each of its contractors (there were two, serving different 
geographical areas) received a base payment, set as a flat dollar amount per household, 
and a recycling incentive payment per ton of material recycled. The contracts were 
competitively bid, and in their bids, companies specified the incentive payment amounts, 
as well as the base payments. As in the current San Jose contracts, the two contractors 
during 1993–2002 were required to do their own processing and kept 100% of residual 
revenues from the sale of secondary materials. 
San Jose’s contractual arrangements, both the current threshold contracts and the 
previous arrangements, are unique among U.S. communities in the degree to which 
compensation is tied to recycling performance. For this reason, it is useful to look 
carefully at the accomplishments of the San Jose system. ILSR reports that San Jose’s 
overall recycling and waste diversion rates in 1996 were 20% and 47%, respectively.21 
The 20% figure is at the low end of recycling rates reported by ILSR for the seven 
communities, but it is difficult to compare recycling rates across communities. Many 
factors outside the contractor’s control affect these rates, such as population density, the 
relative numbers of apartment units and single-family homes, and possibly factors such 
                                                 
 
21 This 47% figure includes yard waste diversion and covers all residential waste, recycling, and yard waste 
for both multifamily and single-family dwellings. Recycling rates from multifamily dwellings are much 
lower than those from single-family dwellings. 
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as household income and education levels (Kinnaman and Fullerton 2001). Ryan (2001a; 
2001b) reports, however, that the recycling rates in San Jose—where the single-family 
dwelling rate stood at 34% in 2001—had stayed the same for a number of years prior to 
adoption of the new threshold contracts. The new contracts were designed, in part, as a 
way to spur the contractors to achieve slightly higher rates (the target in the new contracts 
is 35%). Two cities of similar size, climate, and population density are Portland and 
Seattle, and the ILSR study reports that both had higher recycling rates in 1996 than San 
Jose. Portland’s rate was 23%, and Seattle’s, 29%.22 
Comparing costs across cities equally problematic, but again, a comparison with 
Seattle and Portland may be reasonable. The ILSR study calculated waste diversion costs 
and waste disposal costs in each city. Diversion costs include costs of collecting and 
processing recyclable materials net of any revenues received, and disposal costs include 
costs of collecting waste, transporting it to a disposal facility, and the tipping fee paid for 
disposal.23 Table 5 shows the numbers for the three cities, along with an adjusted number 
for San Jose. ILSR attributed all the recycling incentive payment in San Jose to waste 
diversion costs and none of it to waste disposal costs, yet Ryan (2001a) reports that the 
incentive payment covered approximately 20% to 25% of the contractors’ total costs of 
collecting both material streams. The adjusted costs shown in the table take this into 
account by apportioning 20% of the recycling incentive payment to waste disposal and 
80% to waste diversion. 
San Jose’s waste diversion costs—even with the adjustment—are significantly 
higher than those of the other two cities, as well as higher than its disposal costs. This 
fact seems to be primarily a result of the disproportionately high recycling incentive 
payment made to one of its contractors—more than four times higher than the payment 
                                                 
 
22 Portland’s waste diversion rate (recycling and yard waste diversion combined) was 40%, and Seattle’s, 
49% in the year of the ILSR study; thus overall waste diversion in San Jose compares favorably with these 
two cities. 
23 When collection costs are available only for waste and recyclables together, ILSR apportions costs based 
on tons collected. Administrative costs are included to the extent that ILSR had information on them. 
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made to the other contractor.24 In 1997, Waste Management received a base payment of 
$6.64/household/month for single-family dwellings and an incentive payment of $65/ton 
of material recycled, while the other contractor, a local company called Green Team, 
received $5/household/month plus $280/ton of material recycled.25 If Green Team’s 
incentive payment had been $65/ton rather than $280/ton, San Jose’s waste diversion 
costs would have been reduced to $71/household/year. This figure is in line with waste 
diversion costs in Portland.26 
Even adjusting the San Jose figures does not make the city look like a great 
success story in comparison with similar communities that do not use incentive-based 
contracts. The problem may be that at the same time that financial incentives are used to 
spur more recycling in San Jose, the contract imposes very specific requirements on the 
contractors. The long and detailed list of materials that must be collected includes some 
materials that are not collected in many communities, such as textiles, copper wire, 
aseptic packaging, and used oil and filters. The collection contractor is also required to 
process the materials and is the residual claimant on all revenues earned. This means the 
contractor bears all the risk from secondary materials price swings at the same time that it 
has to collect and process some rather unusual materials. These factors all tend to 
increase the risk premium and the overall cost of providing the service. As explained in 
the section above on the principal-agent framework, when the marginal contribution of 
                                                 
 
24 In addition, San Jose’s disposal costs are relatively low, in part because the city pays a low tipping fee at 
the local landfill. 
25 Multifamily payments are slightly different. 
26 This calculation does not take into account the fact that Green Team’s per-household payment of $5 is 
slightly less than Waste Management’s, $6.64. On the other hand, I made no adjustments to Green Team’s 
multifamily recycling incentive payment, which according to ILSR was $100/ton in fiscal 1997, still much 
greater than Waste Management’s incentive payment. Interestingly, in the new round of competitive 
bidding, Waste Management lost its San Jose contract while Green Team retained its contract. Another 
company, Norcal, won the bid for multifamily dwellings. Also of interest is the fact that, in the new 
contract, Green Team’s reward payment for doing better that the threshold for single-family dwellings is 
$2.16/service unit/year while Norcal’s reward for reaching the higher multifamily target is only 
$1.00/service unit/year. Thus again, Green Team is earning a much higher recycling incentive payment 
than the other contractor. The contracts in San Jose have always been competitively bid, but without having 
further information about the decision process and other features of the individual company’s bids, it is 
unclear why particular companies have been selected. 
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the agent’s effort to the measure of performance is relatively low, the incentives provided 
in the contract should not be too sharp. The city of San Jose appears not to have borne 
this in mind in the design of its contracts. Indeed, most of the cities in the sample are very 
specific about what materials are collected and how they are collected. In such a 
situation, incentive contracts may not provide much motivation for additional recycling. 
It is interesting that PAYT is used in San Jose and in most of the other 
communities in Table 3. Although this type of pricing is becoming more common across 
the United States, only 20% of households in 2002 paid for trash collection in this way 
(Skumatz 2002); the remainder paid a flat fee through property taxes, water and sewer 
bills, and the like.27 It is not a coincidence that communities with high waste diversion 
and recycling rates use PAYT, mandate yard waste separation, and have long lists of 
materials that households are permitted to put in the recycling bins.28 But it would be 
interesting to know how a firm with a more flexible contractual arrangement, along with 
a financial incentive to recycle, would choose to motivate households to recycle and 
divert waste from landfills. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see what recycling 
rates could be achieved under such an approach and at what cost. 
V. Conclusions 
The principal-agent framework and the literature in economics on incomplete 
contracts help shed light on local government contracting practices. The principal-agent 
approach emphasizes the role of risks. Optimal contracts must balance risks, on the one 
hand, and provide incentives, on the other. The theory of incomplete contracts 
emphasizes the importance of relationship-specific assets and the extent to which 
ownership of such assets allows one party in the agreement to exert leverage over the 
other party. Contracts must balance the up-front costs of writing a more complete 
                                                 
 
27 In most communities with contracts, the government takes responsibility for billing households and then 
pays the contractor. This is true for Ann Arbor, Bellevue, Fitchburg, San Jose, and Seattle. In Portland and 
St. Paul, private firms bill households directly, and the firms are required to use PAYT. 
28 In Seattle, the contractor is required to offer households five sizes of trash containers. 
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contract with the costs of renegotiation should the contract fail. Incomplete contracts can 
also provide a rationale for government provision of services.  
In this paper, I analyzed solid waste and recycling contracts in the context of these 
two strands of the economics literature. In the absence of recycling, solid waste collection 
and disposal are relatively straightforward services over which to write a contract. Risk 
issues are minimal, and the only assets that are likely to be relationship-specific are 
waste-to-energy incinerators, facilities that are not common in the United States. Service 
quality is not difficult to define, and households themselves act as quality monitors. 
Reflecting the uncomplicated nature of the enterprise, waste collection and disposal 
contracts tend to be simple and fixed-price in nature. 
Adding recycling increases the risk associated with fixed-price arrangements and 
brings up additional issues of asset specificity and contractual incompleteness. Risk is 
higher for two reasons. First, the contractor must find a way to get households to separate 
recyclable materials from trash; this is not an issue with trash collection, since households 
obviously want to have their trash hauled away and disposed of. Moreover, the contractor 
would like to collect more of the relatively valuable materials (say, aluminum) and less of 
the less valuable ones (most plastics, for example). Second, recyclable materials must be 
processed and sold in secondary markets, which subjects the contractor to the risk of 
secondary materials price swings. Finally, materials processing facilities can be costly to 
build and operate, meaning that significant sunk costs must be incurred either by the local 
government itself or by private markets. The government needs to balance the risk that 
comes from relying on private markets against the risk associated with undertaking the 
investment itself.  
The most recent information on ownership of waste and recycling assets, a 1995 
survey by the International City/County Management Association, shows that 
incinerators, waste transfer stations, and composting facilities are government-owned in 
61% to 64% of communities. Thus communities are showing a preference for owning 
these assets rather than attempting to contract with private firms to provide the services. 
Government ownership of landfills is slightly less common: 56% of communities in the 
ICMA sample reported that landfills they used were government-owned. Recycling 
facilities are mostly private: only about 30% of the communities in the ICMA survey 
reported that they handled recyclable material processing using government employees. 
Recyclables processing is a more complicated enterprise for local government than waste 
collection and disposal. Many communities use contracts for collection of recyclables but 
leave the processing to private markets, simply requiring that the collection contractor 
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ensure that the materials are handled properly. By contrast, waste collection contracts 
often require the contractor to deliver the waste to a particular—often government-
owned—facility.  
In addition to the ICMA survey, I examined in greater detail seven communities 
identified as having successful waste diversion and recycling programs (ILSR 1996). 
With respect to asset ownership and the extent to which they rely on private markets, 
these seven communities mostly follow the national trends that showed up in the ICMA 
survey. Landfills and recycling facilities tend to be privately owned, but waste transfer 
stations are government owned. In terms of the types of contracts used, the communities 
tend to eschew the use of financial incentives for recycling in favor of mandatory 
recycling requirements. For example, in all seven communities, the government has a 
long list of recyclable materials that must be collected, stipulates “pay-as-you-throw” 
pricing of waste collection, and requires that yard waste be collected separately and 
composted. Thus, the communities have decided that the best way to achieve waste 
diversion and recycling targets is to incur the costs of fully specifying performance ex 
ante. They say exactly which materials must be separated and collected from households 
and the prices charged to households. This leaves very little flexibility for the contractor. 
Probably as a result, recycling incentives are not used in most of these communities. 
Contracts are fixed-price, and thus contractors have an incentive to reduce costs in order 
to increase their profits, but there is no direct financial incentive to recycle more. The 
degree to which the contractors are the residual claimants on any revenues from 
secondary materials sales differs across the communities. This is, in fact, the one feature 
of the contracts that varies a great deal. 
The one community that does rely on incentive contracts is San Jose, California. I 
analyzed the San Jose case in some detail and found that the city does not seem to be 
performing any better than two other western cities in the sample, Portland and Seattle. 
The latter do not use recycling incentive contracts and yet have higher recycling rates and 
lower costs. Because the contractors in San Jose have to meet a very specific set of 
requirements laid out in the terms of the contract, I concluded that there seems little point 
in providing incentives for additional recycling since there is almost no way for the 
contractors to respond to the incentives. The incentive contract may be serving only to 
increase the risk premium the city pays to its contractors. Further evidence of this is the 
fact that the San Jose contractors are required to process secondary materials themselves 
and are the residual claimants on all revenues from sale of these materials. The materials 
recycled include unusual (and costly) items, such as used oil and filters, textiles, and 
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copper wire. The contractor is thus subject to a significant amount of risk in secondary 
materials markets. It would be very interesting to see a community such as San Jose 
experiment with a contract that allows the firm some flexibility at the same time that it 
provides financial incentives. 
This study contributes to the empirical economics literature on contracts that 
includes studies such as Bajari and Tadelis (2001), Domberger and Jensen (1997), and 
Banerjee and Duflo (2000). The structure of waste and recycling contracts and the 
patterns of asset ownership in the industry can be explained by elements of the literature 
on principal-agent models and particularly the literature on incomplete contracts. Further 
study of contract structure and waste diversion and recycling accomplishments in 
communities beyond the seven “successful” communities identified here would be an 
interesting extension.
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Table 1. Market Arrangements for Waste Facilities in U.S. Communities 
 
Percentage of communities with each option  
among communities that have such facilities 
 
Government
1  Contract or franchise  Private market 
Waste transfer stations  61.2  32.8  6.1 
Waste-to-energy incinerators  62.7  26.3  10.9 
Landfills 56.2  32.4  11.4 
1Including intergovernment agreements, usually between cities and counties. 
Note: numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: International City/County Management Association Solid Waste Collection and Disposal Survey, 
1995 (Washington, DC: ICMA). 
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Table 2. Market Organization of Recyclable Materials Processing Services 
in U.S. Communities 
 
 
Percentage of communities with each option among 
communities that have recycling programs  
Government employees
1  30.4 
Contract or franchise  47.5 
Private markets  22.0 
1Government includes local government provision (12.2% of communities) and intergovernmental 
agreements (18.2% of communities).  
Source: International City/County Management Association Solid Waste Collection and 
Disposal Survey, 1995 (Washington, DC: ICMA). 
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Table 3. Features of Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts in Selected U.S. Cities
1 
 














San Jose, CA 
Collection         
 
Does waste collection 
contract also cover 
recyclables collection? 





Yes            Yes Yes






Does collection contract 
specify where waste must 
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NA
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No    No Yes
4  Yes
5 
Contract length  3 years  10 years  3 years  10 years  12 years  7 years  5 years 
Waste Disposal         
 
























Is there a disposal 




7  No Yes
6  NA
7  Yes
6  Yes 
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Recyclables 
processing 
       





Private   County   Private   Private   Private    Private 
Is there a processing 
contract, separate from 
collection contract? 






       
 
Are recycling incentive 
payments used? 
No        No No No Yes;  $0.50/ton
collected 






How much of the 
revenues from sale of 
materials does the 
contractor keep? 








  0% 100%
Other features         
Is PAYT used?
9  No              Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Is a list of recyclables 















Is yard waste collected 
separately?  
Yes            Yes Yes Yes No
10  Yes Yes
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  NA = not applicable. 
1 These cities were among those identified in Institute for Local Self-Reliance (1998) as cities with successful recycling programs; all achieve recycling rates between 20 and 40% and 
waste diversion rates (which include recycling and yard waste diversion) between 40 and 60%. 
2 Portland uses a franchise system with multiple franchisees that are required to collect both waste and recyclables from households. 
3 Since Ann Arbor government employees collect waste, this question is not applicable.  
4 There are two collection contracts in Seattle that specify collection of both waste and recyclables; one of the contracts also covers processing and the other contract requires that 
collected recyclable materials be delivered to the processing facility of the first contractor. 
5 San Jose’s collection contract also requires contractor to process materials, thus there is a single contract covering collection of waste and recyclables and recyclables processing. 
6 Communities that own transfer stations have contracts with private companies to transport waste from the transfer station and dispose of it in a landfill. 
7 Since waste facilities are government-owned in these communities, this question is not applicable. 
8 These are the rates for single-family dwellings; multi-family dwelling recycling rate targets are 25% in 2003, 30% in 2004, and 35% by 2005.  San Jose’s penalty and reward 
payments are lump-sum.  In 2002, the reward payment for the contractor serving single-family dwellings was set at $2.16 per dwelling unit served; there are additional higher reward 
payments made when recycling rates reach 42%, 44%, and 46%.  The penalty for not reaching the 35% target is called an administrative charge and the amount is unclear.  The reward 
payment for the multi-family dwellings contractor is $1/dwelling unit if a rate 5% above the target is achieved.   
9 With “pay-as-you-throw” pricing of trash collection, residents pay a price per bag or per container of a particular size, rather than a flat fee that does not vary with volume. 
10 Residents can contract with some private haulers to collect yard waste separately for an extra charge. 
Sources: See Appendix A. 
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Table 4. Waste and Recycling Contractor Compensation Schemes 
in Selected U.S. Cities 
City Compensation  scheme 
Ann Arbor, MI  P(x) = α - c + R(x)  if R(x)≤45x 
P(x) = α - c + 45x + 0.65(R(x)-45x)  if R(x)>45x 
Bellevue, WA  P(x) = α - c + R(x) 
Fitchburg, WI  P(x) = α - c + 0.20R(x) 
Portland, OR  P(x) = α - c + R(x) 
St. Paul, MN  P(x) = α - c + 0.50x + R(x)  if R(x)≤50x 
P(x) = α - c + 0.50x +50x + 0.50(R(x)-50x) if R(x)>50x 
San Jose, CA  P(x) = α - c + R(x) - Ω  if x/M < 0.35 
P(x) = α - c + R(x) + Π  if x/M > 0.40 
P(x) = α - c + R(x)  if 0.35 ≤ x/M ≤ 0.40 
Seattle, WA  P(x) = α - c 
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Table 5. Estimates of Waste Disposal and Waste Diversion Costs (in $/household/year) 
  Waste disposal  Waste diversion 
Portland $143  $  67 
Seattle   101   54 
San Jose   82   105 
San Jose adjusted
*   92   96 
Source: ILSR 1998. Waste diversion includes yard waste composting and recycling. 
*These numbers allocate some of the incentive payment more broadly to collection costs, as described in the text. 
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Appendix A: Data and Information Sources for Table 3 
The starting point for information for all seven communities—in fact, the way that the 
communities were identified in the first place—was the Institute for Local Self-Reliance’s 1999 
study for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Cutting the Waste Stream in Half: 
Community Record-Setters Show How. We then searched on the Internet for basic information 
on each community and the governmental agency responsible for solid waste and recycling. We 
contacted each community directly and whenever possible obtained a copy of the contract 
between the local government agency and the private firms responsible for waste collection and 
recycling. All Web sites referenced below are current as of November 10, 2003. 
Ann Arbor, MI 
Agreement between Recycle Ann Arbor and City of Ann Arbor for Recycling Collection 
Services, 1998. 
City of Ann Arbor, Recycle Collection Services Renewal Agreement, September 19, 2001; 
Contract Amendment, September 6, 2001. 
City of Ann Arbor Solid Waste Management Plan Update 2001–2006, draft for review, March 
2001. Available at http://www.ci.ann-arbor.mi.us/framed/solwste/index.html.  
Personal communication with Richard Smoot, Business Manager, Recycle Ann Arbor, July 15, 
2002. 
Recycle Ann Arbor Web site: http://www.recycleannarbor.org/index.html.  
Resource Recycling Systems, Inc. Web site: http://www.recycle.com/rrsi/index.html. 
Information on operation of recovery facility and transfer station: http://www.casella.com/fcr. 
Bellevue, WA 
City of Bellevue, Solid Waste, Recyclables, and Yard Waste Collection Agreement, April 1994. 
Amendment No. 2 to Agreement. 
City of Bellevue Web site on residential garbage rates: 
http://www.ci.bellevue.wa.us/page.asp?view=9159. 
King County, WA, Web site with landfill and transfer station information: 
http://dnr.metrokc.gov/swd/SWDINFO/CH_landfill.htm. 
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Personal communication with Tom Spille, Solid Waste Program Administrator, Resource 
Management and Technology Utilities Department, City of Bellevue, July 2002. 
Fitchburg, WI 
Fitchburg Public Works, Request for Proposals for Refuse, Recycling, Yard Waste, and Brush 
Collection Services, July 16, 2002. 
Personal communication with Michael Rupiper, Environmental Engineer, City of Fitchburg, 
July 2002. 
Portland, OR 
City of Portland, Residential Administrative Rules and Regulations for Residential Franchised 
Haulers, July 2, 2001. 
City of Portland, Office of Sustainable Development, Solid Waste and Recycling Division, 
Management Report for 2000 Activities, April 2001. 
City of Portland, Office of Sustainable Development, Solid Waste and Recycling Division, 
Achieving the 2005 Solid Waste Recovery Goal and Future Program Direction, July 
2001. Available at http://www.sustainableportland.org/2001_plan_draft4.pdf.  
Metropolitan Services District (regional government agency) Web site: http://metromap.metro-
region.org/MetroMapPublic/index.cfm.  
Personal communication with Bruce Walker, Solid Waste and Recycling Program Manager, 
July 18, 2002. 
Office of Sustainable Development Web site: http://www.sustainableportland.org. 
Portland Bureau of Environmental Services Web site: http://www.cleanrivers-
pdx.org/index.htm.  
St. Paul, MN 
Agreement between City of St. Paul and the St. Paul Neighborhood Energy Consortium, 
December 7, 1998; Amendment to Agreement, 2001. 
Eureka Recycling Web site: http://www.eurekarecycling.org. 
Eureka Recycling, A Comparative Analysis of Applied Recycling Collection Methods in St. 
Paul, May 2002 (report for the St. Paul Neighborhood Energy Consortium). Available at 
http://www.eurekarecycling.org. 
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http://www.twincitiesfreemarket.org/index.cfm.  
List of haulers in St. Paul available at http://www.co.ramsey.mn.us/recovery/Hauler.pdf.  
Personal communication with Alex Danovitch, Business Manager, Eureka Recycling, April 25, 
2003. 
Personal communication with Cathi Lyman-Onkka, Environmental Health Section, St. Paul, 
Ramsey County Department of Public Health, July 15, 2002. 
Resource recovery information available at http://www.co.ramsey.mn.us/recovery/index.htm.  
St. Paul Curbsider 14(1), Spring 2002. 
Select Committee on Recycling and the Environment Web site: 
http://www.moea.state.mn.us/lc/score.cfm.  
San Jose, CA 
“Working It Out: Strategies for Contracting with Waste Haulers to Increase Recycling in the 
Age of Consolidation,” presentation by Ellen Ryan to the National Recycling Coalition 
Annual Congress and Exposition, Cincinnati (September 28, 1999). 
“The Evolution of Solid Waste Contracts in San Jose,” presentation by Ellen Ryan at the Waste 
Expo, Chicago (April 4, 2001). 
Personal communication with Ellen Ryan, San Jose Environmental Services Department. 
August 3, 2001, and August 15, 2001. 
Seattle, WA 
City of Seattle Residential Solid Waste Services Request for Proposals, October 30, 1998. 
Available at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/util/solidwaste/seagarbage.htm.  
Seattle Public Utilities Web site: http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/util/.  
Solid Waste Collection Contract Between the City of Seattle and Washington Waste Hauling 
and Recycling, Inc., April 2000–2007. 
Solid Waste Collection and Processing Contract Between the City of Seattle and U.S. Disposal 
II, April 1, 2000. 
Washington Waste Systems Contract with City of Seattle for Transportation and Disposal of 
Waste, September 1990. Available at 
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http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/util/solidwaste/disposal.htm and 
http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/util/solidwaste/docs/longhaul/specs.pdf.  
Yard Waste Processing Contract Between the City of Seattle and Cedar Grove Composting Inc., 
April 1, 2001. 
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